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it, in part because it is not a compelling technology with an emotional
component that will “command the
imagination like aircraft carriers and
nuclear submarines do” (p. 50). This lack
hinders advocacy of the technology.
The third chapter’s study of torpedoes
shows that the maturation of torpedo
warfare was slow and sporadic. After the
Russo-Japanese War there was debate
regarding the future role of torpedoes,
because of their negligible effects in that
war, but by the eve of World War I the
range, speed, and warhead weight of
torpedoes had increased—with deadly
consequences. The British, Germans,
and Americans all faced difficulties
with sea-launched torpedoes, and early
in the war the Americans’ air-dropped
torpedoes had a staggering failure rate.
For U.S. torpedoes, a reliable magnetic
exploder did not appear until 1943, but
after that the results were impressive.
The authors contend that, more than for
any other technology, torpedo development “shows that the combination of
the right platform and the right target
transforms a technology of marginal
application into one with war-winning
potential” (pp. 77–78). They continue
this argument in the sixth and seventh
chapters, dealing respectively with the
development of submarines and aircraft.
Chapters 4 and 5 (radio and radar,
respectively) provide summaries that for
this reviewer were the most informative
and show the exponential effects of
combining technologies in warfare. Both
technologies are constructed to use the
electromagnetic spectrum, but with
different core purposes. For radio, it is
communication; for radar, detection. The
Italian navy began testing shore-to-ship
radio in 1897, and the British navy did
so in 1899. Radio systems that competed
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with Marconi’s invention soon arose,
with other navies favoring them. By the
time of the Russo-Japanese War, radio’s
naval utility had been proved, and the
technology continued to improve. The
interwar years saw the initial development of radar and its varied use by belligerent nations, and World War II saw its
maturation as an effective naval weapon.
The final two chapters, dealing with
submarines and airplanes, likely will
cover ground more familiar to most
readers, and the authors present very
good overviews of these technologies as
naval weapons. The concluding chapter
provides a synthesis of the lessons
learned from the six weapons studies.
The volume has numerous photographs
and charts that enhance the study, as
well as an extensive bibliography. Equally
weighted chapters provide balance to
the book and ensure it is readable to
generalists yet informative and thought
provoking for all; it is filled with historical examples, well written, and engaging.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

Military Virtues, ed. Michael Skerker, David
Whetham, and Don Carrick. Havant, U.K.: Howgate, 2019. 410 pages. $39.99.

The opening line of Military Virtues captures the attention of the reader with the
provocative teaser: “What does Aristotle
have to teach a fighter pilot?” (p. xxv). In
response to the question, editors Michael
Skerker, David Whetham, and Don
Carrick integrate articles by thirty-eight
warfighters, professors, and chaplains
into one book, combining both theory
and practice into a cohesive exploration
of moral virtues for the profession of
arms. Each of the fourteen segments on
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the warrior virtues provides an overview
that surveys the philosophical dynamics
of the virtue in question, then follows it
with two case studies that consider the
practical implications of that specific
character trait in historical scenarios.
Military Virtues investigates the ideals of
classical philosophy without retreating
into the ivory tower of academia, while at
the same time it examines current practice from the ethical foxholes of modern
and ancient battle spaces without reducing morality to something responsive to
a simplistic manual on decision-making.
Aristotle’s system of virtue as the golden
mean between the vices of excess and
deficiency can shape the military
frontiers of just war theory and a whole
gamut of applied ethics, including the
use of drones, interrogation techniques,
professional military contractors, and
artificial intelligence. From Homer’s tales
of Odysseus in the Trojan War to the account of Chief Warrant Officer Thompson’s intervention at the My Lai massacre
in the Vietnam War, the reader journeys
with distinguished writers and warriors
who invite serious reflection on one of
the most compelling topics in military
ethics: the role and nature of virtue.
However, virtue ethics, whether defended
by Aristotle or contemporary proponents
in Military Virtues, draws a number of
criticisms. In particular, the emphasis on
character seems to dodge the quandaries
of right choices and plays into the
argument of moral relativists, who claim
that all norms are subjective preferences
or social conventions. In championing a
moderate moral objectivity and referring
to Aristotle’s formulation of aretē (virtue)
and eudaimonia (human flourishing),
Peter Olsthoorn maintains that most
philosophers reject moral relativism for
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various reasons. For example, Olsthoorn
points out that virtually all would agree
that it is intuitively self-evident that
“kicking babies for fun is morally wrong”
(p. 2), and this admission of a foundational moral value, along with others
(prohibition of rape, murder, genocide,
and so on), undermines the argument for
moral relativism. Thus, moral relativism
lacks credibility as a viable truth claim.
More germane to military operations,
Olsthoorn considers the Afghan practice
of bacha bazi (the sexual exploitation of
boys by adult male soldiers). According
to moral relativism, bacha bazi calls
for cultural tolerance, and yet this
practice repelled NATO servicemembers
deployed to Afghanistan. Rather than
accept bacha bazi as merely a difference
of cultural values, Olsthoorn conducted
empirical research and uncovered that
bacha bazi actually was outlawed by the
pre-2021 Afghanistan government and,
according to one study, 80 percent of
Afghans find the practice morally abhorrent. The external evidence of law and
public opinion on bacha bazi calls into
question the adequacy of moral relativism as a sweeping theory and undergirds
a more general premise of basic rights
common to all humanity. Skerker notes
that the latter part of the twentieth
century was marked by ongoing twin
reiterations of just war theory and
virtue ethics, but little was espoused in
terms of military virtues. Thus, Military
Virtues is an implicit attempt to bridge
that “curious” gap with virtues in the
armed services that support the enduring
precepts of the just war tradition.
By the time the reader has completed
this comprehensive study, he or she very
well may agree with Skerker’s conclusion:
“Aristotle has much to teach fighter pilots
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as well as SIGINT analysts, artillery
gunners, submariners, ordnancemen,
snipers, linguists, and logisticians”
(p. xxvi). Undeniably, Aristotle does
have much to teach both the military
practitioner and the philosopher of
political theory. But by the same token,
if Aristotle—a master of methodological
induction and a posteriori analysis—suddenly returned to life today, no doubt he
would learn much, just as the presentday military strategist and tactician
would, from the candid war experiences
and the well-reasoned arguments of
the astute thinkers in Military Virtues.
EDWARD ERWIN

Restoring Thucydides: Testing Familiar Lessons
and Deriving New Ones, by Andrew R. Novo and
Jay M. Parker. Amherst, NY: Cambria, 2020. 218
pages. $39.99.

When I was trying to drum up enrollment for an elective on Thucydides
at the Naval War College, one interested student told me that he was most
inspired by Thucydides’s famous quote
that “the nation that makes a distinction
between its scholars and its warriors will
have its thinking done by cowards and its
fighting done by fools.” I did not have the
heart to tell him that he had not only the
quote wrong but the author too. Sadly,
this is only one of many misconceptions
that national-security professionals
have about Thucydides and his work.
Andrew R. Novo and Jay M. Parker’s
Restoring Thucydides: Testing Familiar
Lessons and Deriving New Ones takes on
many of these misconceptions to “push
back against the oversimplification and
decontextualization of Thucydides” (p.
3). In doing so, Novo and Parker appear
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to be part of the response to Graham
Allison’s 2017 Destined for War: Can
America and China Escape Thucydides’s
Trap? and his use of Thucydides as a
crystal ball for future Sino-American
relations. While the authors acknowledge
their issues with Allison’s analysis,
they take pains to point out that they
are less interested in refuting Allison’s
thesis and more interested in providing a corrective to some of the worst
misunderstandings of Thucydides that
followed Allison’s best seller. To that
end, they draw on some of the major
scholarship on Thucydides over the past
twenty years from diverse perspectives
such as literary criticism, translation
mechanics, and international relations
theory. In addition, they rely on multiple
English translations of Thucydides and
even throw in a little ancient Greek.
The authors first identify five “common
threats” that lead readers to superficial
conclusions: that fifth-century Greece
was bipolar, that Thucydides blamed
the international system for the war,
that domestic politics are less important
than state-on-state interactions, that
Thucydides is the father of realism,
and that the Peloponnesian War was
a single unitary conflict between
Athens and Sparta. In each chapter, they
provide something like an annotated
bibliography of relevant books and
articles that support their reexamination
of these misconceptions. In addition,
they present accessible summaries of
some of the most important episodes
of the Peloponnesian War, such as the
political maneuvering during the Peace
of Nicias, the siege of Melos, the Sicilian
expedition, and the fates of Athens and
Sparta after the war ended in 404 BCE.
The book ends with seven lessons to take
the place of the five threats identified
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